Citation(s) from the GunPolicy.org literature library
Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence. 2022 ‘Preemption of Local Laws in Connecticut.’ Other Laws & Policies. San Francisco, CA: Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence. 5 December
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Local Authority to Regulate Firearms in Connecticut
Connecticut has not expressly preempted local laws in the area of firearms regulation. Connecticut courts also have not found that the legislature has demonstrated an intent to occupy the field of firearms and ammunition regulation. Absent a direct conflict with state law, broad local firearms and ammunition regulation appears possible.
In Dwyer v. Farrell, 475 A.2d 257 (Conn. 1984), the Supreme Court of Connecticut considered whether Connecticut General Statutes § 29-28, which authorizes persons to sell handguns at retail if issued a state permit, preempted a New Haven ordinance that placed further restrictions on persons seeking to sell handguns. The court acknowledged that the existence of a state law does not necessarily preempt a local government from regulating the same subject matter as long as such regulation is consistent with state law. The court stated that to determine whether a local ordinance conflicts with state law, the court must review the purpose behind the state law and measure the degree to which the ordinance frustrates achievement of that purpose. The court found that the New Haven ordinance frustrated the purpose of section 29-28 by prohibiting an entire class of persons from selling handguns that the state would have allowed. The court found that this created an irreconcilable conflict between New Haven's ordinance and the statute, which rendered the ordinance preempted.
See also Kaluszka v. Town of E. Hartford, 760 A.2d 1282 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (finding that a municipal ordinance regulating the discharge of firearms had the effect of regulating hunting, which was preempted by the state's extensive hunting laws).
The supreme court discussed the general principles governing preemption more recently in Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 774 A.2d 969 (Conn. 2001). In Modern Cigarette, the court considered whether state licensing and regulatory standards for cigarette vending machines preempted an ordinance adopted by the Town of Orange to prohibit such machines entirely.5 The court reiterated the basic standards outlined in Dwyer and upheld the ordinance, reasoning that state law did not expressly authorize cigarette vending machines, but instead imposed a series of limitations or prohibitions on their use that allowed for additional local regulation, including an outright prohibition. The court also noted that public safety ordinances are given a presumption of validity.
Connecticut General Statutes § 22a-74a(b) states that a municipality's noise control ordinance that limits noise in terms of decibel level in the outdoor atmosphere shall not apply to any firing or shooting range operating on October 1, 1998, if the standards set forth in the ordinance are inconsistent with Connecticut General Statutes Chapter 442 or regulations adopted under this Chapter. However, section 22a-74a does not limit the ability of a municipality to regulate an increase in noise attributable to a physical expansion of an existing firing or shooting range…